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PREF!~CE 
The modern-·wr1 ter in the field of Philosophy no doubt 
recognises the ilfficulty of gaining an ndequate and impartial 
hearing from the students of his own generation. It seems 
that one only becomes great at tbe expense of deatb. The 
university student is often tempted to close his study of 
philosophy- after Plato alld Aristotle as if the final word has 
bean said. The writer of this paper desires to know somethi~g 
about the contribution of the model~n school of phiiiosophers. 
He has chosen this particular study because he believes that 
Dr. \i'hi tehesa bas given a very thoughtful interpretation of the 
universe .. 
This paper is in no way a substitute for a first-hand study 
of the works of Whitehead. It will have served a worthy purpose 
if perchanoe a reading of it prompts students to make other 
original researches. The·lir1ter does not claim that his inferences 
hnd dedactions concerning Professor Whitehead's doctrines are all 
valid but will va.nture to say that no opinions are given without 
serious refleotiva thought. Suob a paper as this could in no 
respects cover the vast lot of msterinl in the many books Y:hich 
Professor Whitehead has written. He bas aimed at an understanding 
of only the mnin doctrines of his philosophy. 
Obviously. the author of such n paper must be indebted 
tG a great many of bis contemporaries. Re has sought to 
acknowledge the sources he has used. so far as he is aware 
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of them, by foot-notes. speo1fio mention should be made, however. 
of the best work which has helped him oome to definite con-
clusions. Re feels grateful in many ways to Dorothy M. Ettmet 
for her .book. Whip,b,ead 's ,?~ilosophy of Organism. !J?he extent 
of indebtedness to Dr. B· o. Holtzclaw. his teacher, faithful 
counselor and friend. cannot well be meastired or expressed. lle 
hns taught him an appreciation ot man's attempt to explain the 
workings of the universe. The influenae ot hia teachings and 
personality has been very stimulating during his u.niversity life. 
F.J.P. 
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The Development of Dr. Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy 
Oonoerning Professor Alfred Borth Whiteheaa•s most 
comprehensive work. ?rooess and Reali~l-· a reviewer bas said. 
nWhether it 1s the product ot·thinking that is essentlall7 
unclear but capable of brief flashes of penetrating insight. 
or whether 1 t is too profound to be .3udged by this generation. 
I do not know. Reluctantl7 I am inclined to accept the first 
alternative."l .. 
As an humble student of Whitehead's writings I must 
confess there is an element of truth in the above quotation. 
Perhaps this reaction is n natural one~ Few thinkers are 
prone to oonf ess their slowness of acumen. It is Ul1 opinion 
that Dr. Whitehead has interpreted the nbrute faots" in a 
brave manner. We owe much 1n the way of appreciation and 
admiration. for indeed. he has sought to make a new world 
View upon the wreckage of a Newtonian materialism. Like 
the great stock market crash of 1929 in the econQmia world. 
came the upheaval of philosophical systems in the metaphysical 
realm. The Non-Euolidian Geometry. the Special and General 
Theories of Einstein and the Quantum Theory have made it 
quite necessary to reconstrnot a new metaphysios. Ohaos is 
1. Miss Stabbing. in Mind. October. 1930. 
close at hand in the field of religion~ It must be rein-
terpreted. After a reading of Jtro&e.s&_anU~. one 
carmot help but feel that he is on the way to a meta-
physics more reall7 helpful to religion than anything 
:r49o~r.rtl1 developed in the fiela of philosophJ"~ MSJ17 
scholars welcome the approscb of this man to the problems 
of religion• 
In bis earlier works~ Prinei;pleot·Battn'al Knowledge~ 
Concept of N~ture, and Introduction to :Uathematios he is a 
pure Realist• "Nature :ls that whioh we observe in per-
ception through the senses •• ~.•'rhu.s 1n a sense nature is 
independent of thought• What I mean is that we oan think 
nbout nature without thinking about tbought."2~ ~ut in his 
later writings he is inclined to a speonlat1ve philosophy~ 
in which he thinks of nature as an aesthetic order. White-
head bas demonstrated that it is possible to be both a 
rationa.lis,t and a romanti~h I:t Sir tinlter Ilaleigh vmre now 
living. he might. speak of Professor -Whitehead as he did 
concerning Wordsworth. "who faced the tact and against whom 
the faot aid not p~evail.· ~o know him is to learn courage; 
to walk Vlith him is to feel the vis1t1ngs of a larger. purer 
air.- ana the peace of an unfathomable skf.,. Who can Withhold 
emotion and awe when these lines are read from Reli5ion in 
the Makins? The reading of this passage sboulu prompt a 
strong desire to ttnderstand the thoughts of a gifted writer 
and thinker., 
2. Concept cf liature,. p.3 
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~ha passage of time is the journey of the world 
towards the gathering of new ideas into actual fact. This 
adventure is upwards and downwards. Whatever ceases to 
ascend• fails to preserve itself and enters upon its 
inevitable path of decay. It decays by transmitting its 
nature to slighter occasions of aatnality,. °bf reason of 
the failure of the new forms to f ert111ze the perceptive 
achievements which constitute its past history. The 
universe ahows us two aspects: on one side it is phy-
sically wasting. on the other side it is spiritually 
ascending. It is thus passing With a slowness. 1.aoon-
celvable in, our measures of time. to new creative conditions. 
amid which the phJsloal. world. as we at present know it. 
will be represented by a ripple bnrel1 to bP d1st1ng:nishad 
from non-entity. The present type of order 1n. the world 
baa arisen from an unimaginable pnst, and it will find. 1ts 
grave in an unimaginable future.. IJ?here remains the ine:x-
hsustible realm of abstract forms. and oreativit1, with its 
shifting character ever determined afresh by its own 
creatures. an<l God, upon whose, wisdom all forms of order 
depena.n3. 
It 1s true tbat in mall1' places Whitehead bas obscured 
his thought by an excessive use of technica~ terms,. but 
the fuller truth is that he quite understands the problem 
of creating a new metaphysics. and if following him, we 
enter into deep sincere In1Sterious moments of contemplation, 
he is well content. for he believes that the simplest of the 
simple theories adequate to account for the facts are those 
which ohe.llenge every fibre of our mental selves. He state1 
that simplioitf and trimness are not present in the world 
of brute faots .. 
l'ltJ!he mater1nlist1o theory has all the ooinpleteness of 
the thought of the middle ages., which had a complete a:nswa:r 
to everything. be it in heaven or in hell or in nature. 
There is a trimness about it~ With its instantaneous present. 
its vanished past. its non-existent future. and its inert 
matter. fh!s trimness is very medieval and ill aoooras with 
brute fact. The theory whioh I am urging admits a greater 
ultimate Jn¥Stery and a deeper ignoranoe ...... It is impossible 
to meditate on time and th~ ffilSteri of the creattye P.assase 
3. Religion in tho llsk1ng. p.159. 
of nature without an overwhelming emotion at the limitations 
of human 1ntel11genoe."4. 
Professor Whitehead is a Realist. Realism holds that 
some or all known objects do not depend on the mind for 
existence. It ls possible that objects exist without being 
known. Spaoe and time. energy. matter. plant world, and 
values may exist independent of a mind. Be is .not a 
materialist nor an idealist. .liot a materialitJt for he has 
thrown away the: Newtonian physics nor an idealist for he-
states that minds are concrete events existing 1n spaqe 
nnd time. There is much of Plato and Aristotle in his philo-
sophy. Re has also been greatly influenced by Eertrand 
Russell. who worked with hL~ in Principia llathematica and 
by s. Alexander, another Realist. 
In the writing of this paper I wish to make three 
ma1n divisions. First. the development of Whitehead's 
metapbysios; seoondlJ. his oonaept of God. and thirdly and 
finall7., the contrast ana comparison of the religious ideas 
of Whitehea~ to tha traditional Christian thought. 
4. Concept of nature. p.?3. 
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Chapter l 
The Development of Whitehead's lletapbysics 
u~he powers of man have not been exhausted. nothing 
has been done bJ him that cannot be better done. There 
ia no effort of science or art that may not be exceeded; 
no depths of philosoph7 that cannot be deeper sounded; no 
flight of imagination that m8.f" not be passed bf strong and 
soaring wi.ng.tt (anonymous) · 
Professor Whitehead*s thought is oontinually developing. 
so that an attempt to evaluate a111 part of it is in some 
sense futile. Vie must follow him as he leads up the winding 
stairs in search for truth. If we find that he hns turned to 
the left we shall soon discover that he descends a few flights 
ana then again bravely olimbs with eyes fixed upon the stara. 
It follows that it might be diffioult for us to retraoe his 
steps and new direction. There is mnob in bis early works 
which runs through ell of his ph1losoph7. There are no 
sharp lines of demarcation but there is an ever development 
of h1s thought as given to ns in The Conce,P,t of N?.ture. and 
Enquiry into the Principles of Uaturnl Knov;led5e. and Intro-
duction to Mathematics. 
The first phase of his philosophy found in th& above 
three publications is that of pnre Realism. 11It means that 
nature can be thought of as n olosed system whose mutual 
relations do not require the expreasion of the fact that they 
are thought about. Thus in a sense nature is independent of 
thought ••••• nntu;re ls not thonRht."5. 
5. Concept of nature. p.3 
"l!he oonaitlons 'flhioh detormlne the Mtuff of events oan onl.1' 
be furniabea bf other events. for there ia noth1c~ elne to. 
nntnro. u6. · 
~ne Whole truth ot the world 1& fonnd in the nature of 
events.. AocorfllnglJ. l?hysica tells us the full trutll about 
the :Pbira!cal vorl~. Events ere the nlth:iate fucta of Mttire 
ar.4 the ult:tnate 6flte. of solcnae. If th1;s !s ~e wa cnnnot 
get VGr? .far 1n iu.u.lorstandlDg this nstonr"'t'U:cg mettlphi$1tJ8 
ualesn tre tn0'11 the ru1tnro ot (10 event,, 
An event is n fonr....Ulmenaional entitJ; in oddltlon to 
tioe. 1t has the three almeOGlOrtff Of spaoo. nsve17 event 
extends tlVm." ott-~r events nbiob are parts of 1tselt .. and 
ever,- evont 1G eztandect over 'b7 othor parts of which 1t 1s 
n ~rt.~v. 
T~ n.nd spa.or; botl1 sp1!'1ilg. from the relatit.u1 of extens1oc .. 
1:1r~e · ie e ££uration; space ia ~t&naicn. thongh i}!e.elean, 
naocr•,11n.5 to nllteheaa. l?hle amt space therefore exp1"ess 
relnt!ona betlfoen the evonts. nature ts a proeess; 1t is a 
beoc,it:d.~~ and tte events a:re tbe oao~ntlal ol~nts of aotm1llt1 
ana elomants of beoo~1nnnoue. An event oan never hnppm1 
nsntn tor ootu~ oan nwer reproouco the sa.'i& relnt1ons. An 
event 1.a a ayateo o'! rolat1ons; it la 3tlet h<m' it is related. 
Ar:otOOr aef; n't relations fort'l a different evont. r;vents do 
no~ obanga but tbe7 pass 1cto othe~ events W'n1oh go to ~ke 
up largOl" e7ent$. Zhns the pnaaage of events 1a extott~ion 
in the ~:lk1n~. 
Our peroeptual'knowledge of nature tells us that there 
exists other types of ent 1ties. When .nature as a who la is 
broken up into its entities we find that there ara five 
modes of a1versifioation which are oh!eflJ important in 
scientific theory. These types consist of: (l} events. 
(2) percipient objects. (3) sense-objects. (4) per~~ptual 
objects. (5) soientifio objects. These are all different 
types with a single common element. that is, they are all 
alike subjects yielded for our knowledge by our perceptions 
of nature. 
There exists in nature events and ob3ects. What are the 
differences between events and objects? What relations exist 
between them? 
First. events and ob3eots enter into our experiences 
by different means. Events nre lived through and exist around 
us. We cannot escape them. they are the faots of life. They 
oome and pass but objects are permanent. Objects are intelleo-
tm lly reaognized. Amid the partial events of the present 
(wh1oh is a duration) we find that there is an element of 
permanence which is the object. Without recognition. experience 
would show us no objects. Amid the flux of events. the flow 
of the everlasting stream we find something permanent. which 
is reoogni~ed as self-1dent1oal amid different situations. 
However. there is a peculiar kind of change attached to objects. 
"The change of an object is the diverse relationships of some 
object to diverse objects. The object is permanent. because 
{strictly speaking) it is without time and space; and its 
change is merely the variety of its relations to tho 
various events which are passing in time end spnoe •••••• 
I~vents ( in a sense) are space and time. namely. space 
and time are abstractions from events. But ob~eots are 
only der1vately in space and time by reason of their re-
lations to events."8. 
The objects do not depend for their being on their 
r.elations. Events do. for they are what the, are just because 
of their relations. Time and space could never fully describe 
the object for it is not dependent on its relations. 
"The continuity of nature is to be found in events, the atomic 
properties of nature reside in objects. The continuous ether 
is the whole complex of events; and the atoms and molecules 
are sa1entif1o ob3eots. which are entities of essentially 
different type to the events forming the ether.n9. 
We "apprehend" an event and nreoogn1se~1 an object.. The 
strnoture of events provides the frame work of the externalit1 
of nature where onr objects are located. 
There are different types of ob3eots. Let us note how 
Whitehe~d has characterised them. 
"~he percipient objeot is the UJlity of the awareness 
whose recognition leads to the class1fioat1on ct a train of 
percipient events as the natural life associated with one 
oonaoiouaness." 
11The sense-ob3eot is the simplest per1:1anenae which we 
trace as self-identical in external-events." The colours. 
tastes. sounds. are sense~bbjects. There are the perceptual 
objects such as the usual ob~eots of common experience, as 
books, tables. chairs, trees. and rooks. The scientific 
e. ~r1no1plea of Batural Knowledge, p.63. 
9. Ibid, p.66. 
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objects inolude eleotrons. 
Perhaps, it would be wise to ma.Ice a clearer distinction 
between an event and an oblcot. 
Def ore me. on the desk ia a number of books dealing 
with the philosophy ot Professor Whitehead. These would be 
tho same books it they were back 1n the University of 
Riahmond library.. The books as books, whether her.e or there, 
are entities called objects. Yet these books do happen to 
be here. Their being here depends upon a vast past. present, 
and future world of interactions. If there existed other 
relations these books would not be here. The relations ot 
an event are internal, and it is these relations which make 
it differ from an object. 
ve have found that Whitehead, like many other modern 
philosophers, bas been influenced by modern physics, and 
calls the ultimate tacts of nature events. Beyond events 
there is nothing, no spaoe and time, no matter,. no"laws of 
nature", no material substance like the ether in wbioh they 
can take place. "The material called ether is merely the 
outcome of a metaphysical crnving. The continuity of nature 
is the continuity of ovents."10. 
As a Realist be objects to the bifurcation of nature,~ 
The secondary qualities are inherent qualities, states \'ih1te-
bead. One gets an excellent understanding of Whitehead's 
ideas concerning bifnrcntion o:t nature. Aooording to hie all 
10. Principles of Natural Knowledge, p.25. 
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of the present clay natural philosopbJ accepts the _fallaoJ 
of bifnrontion which holds that quite untenable division 
of the components of objective llSt-ure into two diametrically 
opposed '.types of exiatenoe, the material and the mental. 
or the phJsioal and psyoh1oal~ The physicist holds that 
sound, color. heat. eto. belong purely to the mind and are 
not present in the physical world. Be is not able to 
bandlo the so called secondary qualities, therefore, tbey 
do not exist except in the tu;.na. 13isbop Berkeley bas gone 
so far in this direction as to assert that nothing exists 
outside of the mind. t!ost scientists hold that a red 
bllliara ball nots on another ball in precisely the same 
manner as a green or s blue one. Where the color is of 
importance 1s the faot that 1t erulbles the players to ea$ily 
locate the ball theJ are playing ~ith. Without life, or 
consciousness there ~ould be no color, taste or sound. 
Since it is argued that the seoondar1 qualities have no 
important aspect in the behavior of pbya1oal obje~ts. then 
the1 must fall outside of physical nature. 
He rejects the above notion of bifurcation. oo,iors, 
sounds~ are as truly physical as are the organs o~ vision 
and hearing. · The sense organs are telepathic because they 
enable us to apprehend wbat exists in nature where the 
organisms tbemselvos are not located; they do this in and 
through the secondary.qualities. We do 1nstinot1Vely 
believe thot there 1s redness 1,g the sunset and not mere1y in 
10 
our minds. The "JobJective worl6 .. is more then bare spatio-
temporal patterns consisting of solidity, shape, weight. 
rest nod motion as the nineteenth oentu.ry Idealist conceives 
of it. It is more than motion; it 1s all of the prima:ry 
colors plus colors., odors, sounds and savors. What we 
need is an 1ntelleotual and a realistic epistemology. I 
gather that Mr. Whitehead supports his thesis in the 
following WSJ'. 
nature, :or any part or parts of .nature. possesses 
qualities which depend on a peculiar kind of relations. 
The state of qualities depend on relations between per-
ceiving organisms. nature is an organism: everything in 
nature is a part of an organism. ~he rook. the flower and 
the human being are all parts of tbe great organism. !hese 
parts range in importance as to their stages of oonsoiousness. 
There is a certain kind of a feeling in this desk. and this 
feeling is as tnU.ch a truth about the desk as feeling 
characterises roe. This desk which I nm writing upon appears 
to me as green; it would appear to an1 other normal sighted 
person as green. and this appearance is es much a truth about 
the table as it is about roe. 
When things are in certain relations. they reallr a.re 
in those relations. We recognize this as a doctrine of 
realism wbioh is known as objeotive relativism. Does White-
head believe that this is a full answer to the questions of 
11 
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blfuroation? It is 1f we think of "appearing" as essential 
to being or in other words if we combine thea'bove doctrine 
with a sort of pansyobism. 
If this doctrine of pansyohism were not added to 
objective relativism the secondary qualities would not be 
inherently present in this desk or in any other aspect of 
the ob3eot1ve world. When I leave this room the greenness 
would leave the desk. In other words, if there were no 
sentient organisms- no feeling things- there would be no 
seoondar1 qualities in the bare faots of life. If there 
were no sentient organism to perceive and recognise there 
would be no oolo:r.-s or sou.nae. This,. of course,, woo.ld 
result in the views of the Cartesian Philosophy. Nature 
would then consist of two parts, onlJ one of v1hiob possessed 
qualities. If, before consciousness (as we commonly use 
the term) appeared on the scene of life in the progress of 
evolution. there were no sentient beings. then it must be 
admitted that a very drastic kind of bifurcation must have 
existed. 
Therefore. ob3ective relativism with a kind of pansyohism 
gives one a much more intelligible meaning es to the nature 
12 
of an ob3eot. Whitehead contends that the individual molecules 
or atoms. (maybe, the quanta) are not only felt bf us but they 
themselves feel. When l feel the color green in this desk~ 
1t also feels. me or the minute parts which go to make up my 
body. Bot only do these particles feel me but they feel or 
prehend the past~ present. future &f all other events or 
things. Theretore 9 when I stand 1n a certain relation to 
an ob3eot. I see green. beoause I am in that direction. The 
feeling of greenness is simply a feeling of feeling. or 
better still. a feeling of feelings. Later. in his philosophy. 
in hj.s e1n'borat1on of the dootrlna of eternal objects., be 
maintains th.at a green object feels or prebends the eternal 
object of gree~nesa. 
Whitehead's viewpoint of time also has nn ioportant part 
in his phiiosophy. nature is not static 1t is a process. 
always fl:::·wing on. Events e.re continnouslf happening. An 
event hever happens again. All nature is n growing process. 
Change is ever present with us. Re states that nature is 
not. as in the traditional view~ a sequence of instantane&us 
ovents; for anoh a view comes from a fnlse sense of time .. 
"The relations of other events to this totalit:1 of nature 
form the texture of time."11. 
"On the mnterialistio theory the 1natantaneous present 
is the only field for the creative activity of nature. The 
past is gone and the future is not yet. Thus (on this theory} 
the immediacy of peroeptlon is of an instantaneous present 
and this unique present is the outcome of the past and tbe 
promise of the future. But we deny this immediately given 
instantaneous present. There is no Stlob thing to be found 
in nature. , As an ultimate fact it is a nonentit~. What is 
immediate for sense-awareness is a duration. Now a duration 
has within itself a past and a tnture; and the temporal 
breadths ot the iramediste durations of sense-awareness are 
very indeterminate and dependent on the individual percipient. 
liooora1ngl37, there is no uniqu.e :factor. in nature which for 
~verz percipient is preeminently and necessarily the present. 
li. Concept of Nature. p.53. 
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The passage of natur{J leaves nothing between the past and 
future. What we perceive as present is the vivid fringe 
of memory tinged lvi tb anticipation. This vividness lights 
up tbe disoriminated field within a auration."12. 
Accordingly. ip time is a duration. Whitehead has 
14 
further proof for the existence of secondary qualities within 
the phraical world. If the melody. say of the nightingale's 
aong. ''extending over a sequence of events. demands for its 
apprehension as melody. certain mental processes. namely. those 
which make possible recollection ana nntioipat1onn. it. the 
melody. may really exist as an item in physical nature. fhe 
newtonian physics does not acknowledge persistent melodies 
but it does believe in persistent eleotrons. atoms and mole-
cules which are moreor less in the SSI!le olnss. Whitehead 
points out that if traditional physics would be consistent 
ana still hold true to the "instantaneous view" then these 
persistent eleatrons. atoms and molecules could not exist any 
more than the melody which is a secondary qua11tf. Physics 
has built up a soience. I~ has formulated laws of relations 
between sucaessive physical phenomena. These pers1steno1es 
of atoms. electrons a.ncl molecules. as rhythmic presuppose 
du.ration as truly as does a melody. One is instinctively 1n 
sympathy with Wb1tebend as ho proceeds in hie logical manner 
of sttem~ting to prove that the tastes are as real ns the 
texture of the meat. that the melody of the Ofl!U117 aa well as 
the struature of the auditory sense organ. that the greenness 
of this desk as well as the rods and cones of the retina. -
12·. Concept of Nature. p.'12. 
Space also is a conceptual t,ter1vative from the fact of 
the passage of na.tnre~ I understand thnt 1.:r;. ¥i111tehaali 
accepts the genernl features of Einstein's PhyGics, bit 
drnws n set of different significancea from it. no doca 
not exoopt the Bim:;~·~in curvature 1n the space-time manifold• 
He does not believe tbnt physioal phenomena are due to the 
oddities of space. I~ natnre is uniform, then the spatio-. 
temporal relations must exhibit a basis for uniformity. Space 
and time are among the most systernatio relations between 
actual entitles or events. "The whole which is present tor 
tUsoriminntion is posited in sense-awareness as necessary 
for the discrimlneted parts. An isolated event is not an 
event. beoatise every event is a factor ot a larger whole n.nd 
is signifionnt of thnt whole. There can bo no time apart 
from space; and no apace apart 6rom time; and no space and 
no time apart from the passage of the events of tlllt~e. The 
isolation of an entity in thought, when we think of it as 
'bare "it 0 • has no 0011nterpnrt in aey corresponding isolation 
in nature. 8nch an isolation ls merely part of tho procedure 
of intollectual knowled~e."13. 
The notion of aitnple location in modern philosophies of 
nature is bound up with the bifureotion of primary snd 
seoondary qualities. In his chapter on "The Century ot 
Genius" in Sc1enoe and l.fodern World, he gives a stimulating 
disausslon showing how this not ion o:f! simple location hna 
resulted in bringing about the sharp 11.ne of clevernge 
between the dualist and tbe monists. The wholo quarrel he 
asserts. was introdl1ood. by the ascription of "misplnoed 
oonoreteness" to the soientifio aohema of the sevnnteentb 
century. 
~hitehcad £1Ves h1s ideas concerning the notion of simple 
13. Oonoept of Hature. p.141. 
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location. "To say that a, bit of matter has simple location 
means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relations. it-
is adequate to state that it is where it is. in a definite 
region of spaoe. nnd throughout a definite duration of time. 
apart from any essential reference of the relations of that 
bit of matter to other regions of space and to other durations 
of time. Again. this concept of simple location is indepen-
aent of the controversy between the absolutist and the 
relativist views of spnoe and time. So long as any theory 
of space. or of time. can give a meaning, either absolute or 
relative, to the ideas of a definite region of space. and of 
a definite duration of time. the idea of simple location has 
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a perfectly definite meaning. This idea is the very foundation 
of the seventeenth century scheme of nature. Apart from 1t. 
the scheme is incapable of expression. I shall argue that 
among the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our 
immediate experience. there is no element whatever which 
possesses this character of simple location. It does not follow 
however, that the soienoe of the seventeenth century was 
simply wrong. I hold that by a process of constructive ab-
straction we can arrive at abstractions which are simply-
looated bits of material. nnd at other abstractions whioh are 
the minds''inoluded in the scientific scheme~ Accordingly the 
real error is nn example of what I have termed: The ~allaoy 
of t'iisplaoed Oo.(l.oreteness. 0 14. 
Theretore. in place of the old ideas of matter as spaoe-
oocup71ng bodies. Professor Whitehead has given to ns his 
conception of events. Throughout this paper we will tind 
that he is continually enlarging and changing his ideas of 
the events. In the phase of development of his thought which 
is of a speoulative nature. we shall learn that the guiding 
idea 1n understanding his events :a-pp-·e'ars to be derived from 
the facts of visual perception. The term prehension carries 
a discussion of this idea. 
Dr. Whitehead begins his thought oonoerning change and 
permanence very early in his philosophy. As change is 
expressed in the "doctrine of events", so permnnence is 
accounted for in tbe ''dootrine of objeots~·· 
14. Science and the Modern World, p.84. 
ttwhatever passes is an event: Ent we find entities 
in nature whioh do not pass: n..cimely. we recognise samenesses 
in natnre •••• The green itself is numerically one selt-
lV 
identionl entity, without parts because it is without passage."15 
From the writing of this paper we have really learned three 
oharaoteristios concerning the brute facts. or things which 
form the very "stuff" of the universe. When we experience 
ocourences we find that some "things are hara. others are 
there". This ·aharaateriatia is denotive d_eterm1nat1on or 
spatial differention. The second truth we find concerning 
the events of life is that of change. or temporal d1fferention. 
No thing or event is ever exactly repeated. An event never 
bas its unique individuality again. If there is one relation 
changed the event becomes another event. From this aspect 
ot o.n event. we understand wby time is real. Again. we find 
in the midst of those changing events the oharacteristic of 
eternnlity. or _temporal i·deriti-&y. A form of Platonism is 
resorted to here for there are some qualities which are 
peculiarly recurrent. These are objects, nnd lllELWe have 
found out, they differ from events in thnt they are factors 
in nature which are without passage. "Events are named after 
the prominent ob3ectB situated in them. and thus both in 
language and in tbought the event einlts behind the object. 
and becomes the mere play o! its relatio.ns."16. 
Here we have the idea of a real process taken vor1 
1er101uil3 ana, in adu;ttioo a Corm of Platonism. Ile has built 
15. Oonoept of Nature. P• 124. 
16. Ibid. p.135. 
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his entire philosophical system arouna the event and the ob-
J eot or change and permanence. As we shall 1ater d1soover 
in the chapter on "God" in the Soienee and Modern World. he 
treats fully the role of the Divine in the "permanences" ot 
life. IJ!he process is like that of l3ergson•s 'Creative Evolution" 
fo:t.' each new event in conceived of as a "real plunge into novelty"· 
The "OreatiVity of the worl:d is the throbbing emotions of the 
past. hurling itself into a new transcendent fact. It is the 
flying dart of .Which Luoretius speaks. hurled beyond the bounds 
of the world." 11 This continuous Jjassagtif of events is not 
entirely novel for we ~ecognize that some characters or forms 
are repeated again and again. There is a . chapter on 'Rhythms" 
in The Pr1no1plea of Natural Knowledge. the reading of which 
gives one a fine understanding of the permanences ot existences. 
The repetitions as recognized are rhythmic oocurenoes. (This 
is the electronic wave theory of matter). In bis later books 
he expounds ~ore concerning rhythms which ~orks out better with 
his interpretations of events. In this·first .phase of his 
philosophy he thinks of nature as a passage of events. later 
he implies that it is a passage of processes of experienoe. 
In lYlany respects he is like Regel in his views. about the 
process as the main truth about the universe but he differs 
in the respeot that he admits novelty. It I nnderstand correct-
ly, Hegel's unfolding of the universe is a natural and logi~al 
outcome of what was already implicitly there. Whitehead closes 
his chapter on "Rhythms" in The Principle of :Natural KnowledGe 
17. Adventure of Ideas. P• 22~. 
with these words. 
"So far as «irect observation is oonoerned al.l that we 
ltnow of the essential relations of lile 1n nature is stated in 
two short poetic phrases. ~he obvious aspeot by Tennyson. 
"Blow,, bugle. blow. set the w1l4 'Oohoes flying. 
and answer. echoes. answering. dying. dying. dying.n 
Namely,, ~ergson's elan,vitnl·and· its relapse into matter. 
And Wordsworth with more depth. 
nThe music in my heart I bore,, 
Long·after it was heard no.more." 
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Natura is orderly in all of its aspeots. «There can be no 
living soienoo unless there is a widespread instinctive oonviu-
tion in the ·existence Of an orde-r of !h1ngs,, and• in partiC'ular • 
of an order of Nature." 18' "It is not the case tha.t there 
is an actual world which socidently happens to exhibit an orde~ 
of nature• There is an actual world because there is an order 
in nature. If there were· n~ order• there would be no world. 
Also. since there is n world we know there is an order• The 
ordering entity is a neoessnr, element in the metaphysical 
situation present by tho actual world.n 
It seems to me it 1s e.t this point that he leaves his dis• 
oriptive philcsophy and begins his speoulativo thought. 
'.Beginning in the Science nnd the Modern World, he atteml'.)ts to 
answer why nature is orderly and t~j.es to give an u.nderstanding 
of the natural world in terms of metaphysics. As one reads the 
18. Soienoe and The Modern World. P• 5• 
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last page of Process and Real.itz pe w111 rightly-guess that 
there are no problems o:t realities loft over for dleoussion. 
It should be hj:ghly interesting to follow Mr. Whitehead in the 
important doctrines of the seoond phase of bis philosophy. 
Some of these doctrines are "prehena1on". "in.gression".,"con-
cretion", and that of "feelingtt. 
In the paper so far we have treated his early vievts of 
events. ob3eots., bifurcation of nature. time.- space and time, 
simple location~- change and permanence, and the OI"'derlinesa 
of nature. Professor Whitehead now begins to launob out into 
the deep. Re develops a philosophy of. organism• Many th1ttkers 
bave been surprised and astounded at the comparatively eas1 
style in Whioh he dieoussesi-"aotual entities" end their inter-
nal and external relations. The doctrine of "organism" is 
developed into a unique and comprehensive philosophy. Much 
of his later wrltings are built upon his early ideas in a 
sense but throughout bis entire system we tind him adding or 
modifying many of them. For instance in his "Process and 
Realitz" he gives a divergence from his aitGo&dent philoso-
phical thought in the treatment of "actual entities"• •pre~ 
hension"• and "ontological principle"• nEvents" are.continued 
but now have new names. naotual entit1n and naotunl oooasion";· 
naatual entities" also termed "actuai occasionsn. are the 
final real things of which the world is made up. There is no 
going behind actual entities to :find anything more real." 19. 
The "ob3eots" are beooming nmore eternal" and are also used 
throughout the system but they have become difterentiatod into 
two aspects- the ob3eot1ve and the sub3ecstive. 
At this stage in Whitehead's philosopbi we find him laying 
more stress on the idea that nature is n process. 1.fhroughout 
his writings he takes nature as a process rather serionsl7. 
The final real thing is the going-on, or happening of something. 
Even our intuition of nature makes us feel that it ls a prooess. 
Eve17thing that might be said about the universe which contains 
any element of truth must be related to the final atomic events 
or aotual entities. In order to emphasize the fact that an 
actual entity is what it is and where it 1s; that is, because 
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of its relations, Professor Whitehead uses term uaotual occasion" 
in plaoe of the term "actual ent1t1«. Again the term "event" 
in Process and Realitx bas a more definite meaning. ~1 shall 
nae the term event in the more general sense of a nexns of 
aatual oooaaions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in 
one extensive quantu..~."20. One must keep in mind that nature 
is a passage of experienoes~ 
The doctrine of prehension is very important in this system 
of thought. Frebension is a general word meaning the grasping. 
taking hold, or unifying of one thing ly another. Apprehension 
suggests oonsoiousness but prehension implies no mind or oon-
sciousness. nFor :Berkeley's mind'~, Dr. Whitehead writes: 
"I substitute a process of prehensive u.nifiaation ••• The things 
whioh·are grasped into a realised unity, here and now. are not 
20. Process and Reality. p.113 
the castle. the cloud, and the· planet simply in thems.elves; but 
they nre the castle, the·o1ou4, and the planet from the stand-
point, in spaoe and time, of the prebensive unification. In 
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other words, 1 t is the perspective. of the .castl·e over there from 
the standpoint of the unifioatio,n here. It is, therefore,.. aspects 
of the castle,. the ol;~:ud. and the planet which are grasped into 
unity bere. You will remember that the idea of perspectives is 
quite familnr in philosophy. It was·1ntroauoed by Le1bn~~ 
in the notion of his monads mirroring perspectives of the unl-
'ferse. I am using the same notion, onlJ I mn toning down his 
monads into the unified events in spaae and time." 21 
This mirroring is a kind of generalised unconscious per-
ception. The actual world is a manifold of prehensions. DUt 
these prehensive unities do not possess simple looations in 
space and time for spaoe and.time are only abetractions from the 
"totality of prehensive unification as mutually patterned in 
euoh other." "A prehensionhas simple l.ooation at the volume A 
in the same wa1 as that in whioh a man's face fits on toethe 
smile which spreads over it." 22 We might draw· e,-0nolu.sions: 
prehension is the complex content.of a pofssib1e act of·peroep-
tion oonoeived as indop~ndent of the perceiver. 
We are now ready.to say that the·aotual 9ntitie1at are 
"prehensive oooasionsn·that is. they are what· they are beonuse 
of the nature of othe~ oocaaio.ns. In this philosophi of 
organism the actual entity becomes_iae.o.:tified with feeling. 
for each new fact is a .pew oe.nter of experie11oa. a new oore:of 
sent1anae. From What is' saia •. the render might surmise that 
this 1s only a peculiar way, of expressing tbe Hegelian philo-
oophJ of org .n~sn.- :SUt !:t! we r.ememba~ Hegel. he tells u.s ·how 
the one, the absolute becomes the mnnJ. but Whitehead ·is concerned 
21~ Scienoe ·and Modern \!orld. P• 102 
22. Ibid p.105 
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with the problem of how the man1:beoomes the one. In 
other words. there 1s n long train of induoti~e thought in 
the evolution of matter or events before one.reaches the 
Absolute in Hegel's universe. But in a grain of sand, plant, 
animal or man. one oan see the universe in either entity 
from a new oenter. .Like Leibnitz the actual entitJ mdtrrors 
the universe from its own point of view. ,-'?his view of the 
actual entity differs from the similar view of Leibnit2, 
however. in that we have a growing out. new ooaasions arising 
wbioh give new comprehensive pictures of the universe. Aotual 
entities arise out of their prehension of other entities. 
There are no two entities alike for they have their individual 
and unique oharaoteristics. 
~he theory of perception is none other than that of 
prehension. Whitehead bas used the new term in order that 
he might get away from the ordinary meaning of perception. 
Prehension menns more than just a sort of passive awareness 
of things presented to experience. l?eraeption now ls a. 
unification of experiences. Prehension differs again from 
the common way of thinking about perc~ption: the term pre-
bension is used :for "uncognitive apprehension~', ":!?he word 
peroe1ve is, in our common use. shot through and through 
with the notion of oognitiv~ apprehension. So is the word 
apprehension, even with the adjective "cognitive11 omitted. 
I will use the word prebension for unaognitive apprehension: 
by this I mean apprehension whioh may or may not be oognitive.n23 
Tbe non-oognitive aspaot of prehension is the more important 
in ufderstsnd1ng Whitehend'a philosophy. This is identified 
"": 
23. Science and Uodern Vlorld. p.101. 
with feeling. .In tho Categorles of Espla.nat1ot.t. ,.po&it111e 
proheno1onstt ere 1ttentlf1aA with l*1&el.1.ogs.". ftese poettive 
feellnss ore the fe&11nga of a sibject.. fhe '*negatl'Ve p~e­
hensiona" a:ro those \th1cb are sa1a to ffeJ.traltlate from fecl1ng". 
It enoh thing prehends ever:r thing else. what l!m1tat1ons 
keep GVerr thing from knowi~ 011 th11'1gs? If there are J:UJ 
4iat1not1ons or lifl1t•t1ons placed u~on aotual entitles then 
we might expee~ to f lnft a statio universe. There wc111d bo 
no plunges 1nto nove1t1. rt0 real e'1olut1on. We fin4 t1f0 
11m1tattons npon aotual entities. fhe Piootr1ne of ant1a• 
fnotion" and the npr1no1ple of COl1Cl'et1on". or Goa. 
~he doctrine of satlsfection tells us that ever., actual 
entit7 ta a soc1et1 of feollng wbioh is as lt 1e because of 
its sub,eotive atm. The Categories of 6nb3eot1vo llllltf and 
of Ob3eot1ve ldentltv treat of tb1s dootr1oe ot aat1sfaot1on. 
~e manr feelings '1h1oh beloag to an. 1neomplettt phase ln 
the preaess of an aotual ont1tJ;. though un1ntegratea 'bJ 
reason of tho 1noom:pletoness of the pbs.se. are compatible 
for lntogratlon b1 reason of tbe Uf11t; of tbe1r enb,oot.• 
And fro~ the latter ontego17 we read. ~hero can l& no 
dupltoatlon of 8fl1 element 1n the obJeotlve datum ot the 
"sat1e:faot1ontt of an octua.l entitJ. eo tar as oonoer.na the. 
function of tbot element la th$ nsat1etact1tHl.-. Bero as 
ttlways. the term neat1sfaot1on" means tbe one complex h.117 
aeterolnate f'ecl1ng \'lh1ch 1& the oompleto4phase 1n thEI prooesa." 
The su.b3ective aim of every actual entity 1s to seek 
its own satisfaction. Every thing seeks a yalue and 
because it is satisfied when it reache~ it. then this must 
be a limitation. ~"The element of vnlue. of being valuable, 
of having vnlue. of being an end in itself. of being some-
thing which 1s for its own sake, must not te omitted in 
any account of an event as the most concrete aatual some-
thing. ''Value" is the word I use for the intrinsic reality 
ot an event."24. There would be no world 'o4.,actual entitles 
if there were no value for it is the key to existence. The 
Gray Castle Rock in Edinburgh as well as human Sttbjeo ts 
seeks the sub3eot1ve aim of satisfnction. 
The second limitation placed upon aotual oooasions is 
the principle of concretion. There is the more innlnsive 
actual entitr which is God who gives the subjective aim to 
less inclusive notual entities. This principle makes a 
.cosmos out of the universe. It sets np an order. !his 
constitutive principle gives actuality to the universe for 
it gives conoretlp.ess to all things. (fbis word used, 
oonoretion comes from the la.tin, oonaresoere. meaning the 
proo&ss of many diversities growing together into a-new 
unit1, which, e.t the culmination of the process realizes its 
full nature and so it is concrete (ooneretlllll). 
"God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is 
the ultimate irrationality. Bo reason can be given for just 
24. Science and The Modern World. p.136. 
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that limitation whiob it stands in bis nature to impose. 
God is not concrete. but He is the ground for concrete 
sotuality. Bo reason can be given for the nature of God. 
because that nature is the ground of rationality."25. 
In my next ohapter, I shall d1sanss at further length this 
principle of oonoret1on. 
In !rooess and Reality Whitehead has brought his 
thought to a close. At the beginning of this work be gives 
us his cstegorinl soheme whioh begins with "Four Hotionsn 
followed by four sets of "Categories". one of whioh is in 
turn subdivided into eight "Categories of Explanation"f:" 
while a third ttcntegoryn 1s subdivided into nine "categorial 
obligations." lie uses the term noategories*' quite differently 
from the vmy in which Kant uses it. Re is like Aristotle 
here for he uses categories to express the different wags 
into which reality oan be classified. fhe categories having 
nothing to do w1 th the mind ·and are not innate b~i any means. 
They are closely associated with the actual entitles them-
selves. "Everr entity should be a specific instance of one 
category of existence, every explanation should be n specific 
instance of categories of explanation. anct every obligation 
should be a specific instsnoe of oategoreal obligations. ·~be 
Category of the Ultimate expresses the genernl principle 
presupposed in tbe three more special oategories".26 
From the quotation above it is learned that there 1s 
sn ultimate which underlies the other three special categories. 
In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 
"Creativity·~ and as we shall ln.ter find. God is its primordial. 
25. Science and Yodern World. p.257. 
26. frooese and Reality. p.31. 
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non-temporal accident •. This notion of "oreativityff seems 
to implJ that it is the basic and most general reality 
which underlies the worl6 of things. Whitehead says that 
"creativity". "many". and "one" are the ultimate notions 
oonneoted with the understanding of "things" or"entitiee". 
We do not quite understand the nature of this "creativity" 
for it is t'he ultimate irrationality. It is present. but 
as for its exact nature and. the why of its existence. we do 
not know. Th~ notion "one" does not mean the integral 
~ 
nnmber one for it is more general. It implies the stmJU-
larity of an occasion. 110ne" and "many" do not stand apart 
for the notion "one" implies the notion "many" and vice versa. 
The universal of all universals is ncreativity. This 
ultimate is the means by which the many. the "plurslity"of 
oooas1ons. whioh are the universe disjunctively. become the 
one actual ooonsion. whioh ls the universe conjunctively. It 
lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex 
unity.~ 
Bot only 1s Creativity the universal of universals but 
2'1 
it is nlso the principle of novelty. Bo tizo entities are alike. 
novelty is always present with the coming of new relations. 
"'Becoming" is the important thing. 'Being and relatetlneas are 
considered as aotual entities. It seems to me that"relntedness 0 
is dominant over "qualities". "The ultimate metaphysical 
principle is the advnnae from dis~nnotion to oonjunotion. 
---------------
o novel ont1t7 othor than the !tntities given in iU.&3uoot1on.•ev 
This notion ct the »many~ and the ~onett presupposes the term 
"coneresoenoeff• Wb1tehead himself etate& that the neategorg o~ 
of the Ultioate" replnoes Aristotle's eat&gory of "prim&rJ 
onbstanoi:;.u. 
Wbitebeaa 1a ~h1loeo~hg of Organlem bas two 1inpl1oat1ons. 
11rnt. it attempt• to 4esor1t& ho~ creativity 1e the me$na bJ 
Which the "oa.ftl0 oomes out of the 11maog" ana. nman1" out of the 
ttone" ond seoonulJ'., 1t ts an attempt to e~bib1t fact as SOl!le-· 
thlng concrete. that ls. it sookn to sbow how oonoreto feota 
exhibit otmrsoterintloa. wb1ob can be onmlt\erea ns abotraot 
from 1 tself. and aeacr1be4 in some k1n4 of s,mbollsm. We 
eboul4 cot auk bow conorete p-arttoular faot oan be built up 
out of universals bnt tbe real pb1losophio rraestion.ta bow 
osn concrete foot G%b!ll1 t ent1 t lea abstract from 1 tselt arJl 
7et pnrt1elpated in bJ its oun nature. ~bie i?bll,,,;oophJ of · 
orgnn1nm 1s an exploc.ation of al:stract1on tu1a not of eoncreteQ 
oess. "It is by roaaon of their 1nstlnot1Vtl grnsps of Ult1~ate 
truth that. 1n spite of tnttcb ruieoo1at1on -u1tb arbitrarJ' ftum1-
fnln0"t;t~ ant! ntn~istio mystle1om. t1tJt1& or Platonic pbiloaophy 
retain their abiding oppenl; tbe7 seek the fol"t! in tbe facts. 
Bncb fact ls more than its forms. and each tom 8 part1o1pntoa" 
thronghc.m t the world of tacte. ?he aet1ni teness of facts is 
due to 1t& forms; but the 1na1v14tt.n1 fnct 1& a. areatttre. ana 
creat1v1t1 ls the nlt1mate beb1n.4 nll foms. lnexpllonblc by 
forms. and conditioned by its orentures:."28. So it seems to 
me that in the Philosophy of Organism. it is not "aubata11ce" 
which Us' permanent butt1forms". 
We oome to the dotttrine o~ the"ontologioal prinoiplen. 
All real things are actnal entities. therefore. any reason 
29 
or description about anything must be due to actual entities 
and their charaoteristio. This does not seem strange for 
Whitehead has gone so far as to say that God 1s an actual 
entity. "Actual entities also termed actual oooaslons- are 
the final real things of which the world is made up •. There is 
no going behind actual entities to fiJld a111thing more real. 
They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity. so is 
the most trivial puff of existence in far-off emptJ spaoe.n29 
Thus we find that Whitehead has obanged the emphasis from the 
primary 9.Jld soconda?'J" qualities of spatio-temporal and sensible 
qualities to a "neutral monismu. !h& "stuff" Of which things 
are made is neither material nor mental. but neutral. If we 
are to take this ontological principle ser!ousl1 then the ver1 
essences. or universals as t'forms of definiteness" cannot 
merely float. aetacbea from any form of existonoe. ~heu must 
have a plnc~ 1n the actual entities. This category of 
explanation. which ·is the Ontological Principle. means that 
actual entities nre the only reasons; so when we search for a 
reason we sea.rob for on or more actual entities. Thus we have 
the norganism" for the prlnolple is onlr a description of the 
28. Process and Reality. p.30 
29 .• Ibid. p.2'1 
the universe as a solidarity of many actual entities. Some-
thing oannot float into the world from .nowhere. We shall 
treat this pr1no1ple again in further discussions. Aooording 
to it. llltulJ thinkers are wrong in placing mathematical. 
formulae as ultimate and independent in themselves. for there 
are 110 tormulae nor laws of nature ape.rt :from descriptions and 
chnraoterist1cs of actual entities- either God or a less in-
clusive society of occasions. 
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We have already entered into a rather comprehensive 
treatment of events or aotual entities a.a prehensive occasions, 
but it would do well tor us to disouss the doctrines ot :Subjective 
aim •. objectification. and satisfaet1on. -. The latter. has 
already been·mentioned as a limitation on the process of pre-
hension. 
Ever1 actual entity 1s what lt is because of the nature of 
other events which it feels. !he world o~ occasions influence 
and oondltion·eaoh other. It is not possible to abstract an 
individual entity from its setting in the world of events. for 
all events are being acted upon and are themselves acting upon 
other events. Though each of these stand or fall with the other 
events they have their own unique and individual nature so that 
it beoomes a new picture of the universe. Whitehead states 
that enoh of the entitles have their own subjective aim. that 
is they have an end in view. This looks like a form of an 
immanent teleology. !heir sub3ective aim is to rea'l.ze their 
1na1v1auslit7 ,,,. be:eomltig a unitr thnntgh their prebealo.a 
or feallrigs of other ent1tieB. Tb1• nlatlon of foellngs 1• 
aa true ot the root n .ot th& humtS sub~eot. USeleooe ts 
taking on s mm aGl)ect wbicb Is nottber purel7 phJ'Sical aor 
ptttel1 b1olog1oal. lt is beootntr~ tbe 8W6f ct orp:ntams .. 
»i1olo!'.; ie the sttttl)' of the larger organlsas.; •bere&s. pb7sies 
ls tbt"t etca; of the mnaller orgnntes.aso. l?roti this one ll1ght 
hold thetti'hlteheae ea11a that thtn'e exiat a varying d~fP'fl&of 
purpose (whetb&r-oonso1oua or unoonsoiw$neul ln every raa'bl of 
ooeaslomt. !he pr1mM:41al natu.~ of God wblcb 1a outsi:le of 
Apace and- ttme. has a eub~ect1ve aim as trell as tbe otber 
. . 
ent1tio& •hlch ffli~ht e:iat ln spsoe ana tit:le. 
In the twent1•fou.rth categor7 of th$ ~cat$gorl$& of Ex-
pl.nns.tl on,. Dr. Wb1tebed gives us an idea of \!hat he mear..s bf 
"ob~ect!flcntlon'*. 'Ctfb& funot1onlng ct one aotttal eatltg in the 
-eelf-oreet1on of a.nothor eotual ~ti t7 18 the 1tobleotifloat1cu1. 
of tbe former tor tbe lf!tter actual entity. The functioning 
of an eterool o'bSeot la the aelf-oreatitut of an e.otnnl entity 
ls the 1r~nss1cn of the eternal ob~Etct la tho aetunl ent1 tf.'" 
Therefore. one ent1tJ' msr help a.notbel"' ent1t1 to orMte ltsolf 
or to real1~e tta anbJec.-.tve c.bl by ob~eot1fJ1ng 1ts&lt 111 
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that actual &ntitJ• !he ways in •blob notrutl ltntlties n.niff tbe1r 
prebo.ns!ons ia tbei~ proeoss of &elf formo_t1on ar& etn.imente4 in 
Category ot iltplaaattoo. 13th. as emotions. volu.atl<.um. purposes. 
adversions. aversions. oonsc1ousness.n · Tbell8.ture of all 
nots.al entities is the result of the way in which they 
organise their perspectives of the other entities. 
There are different intensities to the subjective 
experiences en3oyed by the actual entities. The greater the 
intensit1 the more selective of prehensions is tbe oooas1on. 
The sub3ect1ve form determines the process of prehension 
en301ed by a "thing". Therefore occasions prehend and ignore 
other entities. The mode in wbioh en entity enters into or 
is concreted with another depends upon its subjective fc.\rm. 
~he difference between a positive and negative prehension 
is that of feel3ng. A pos1t1ve.prehens1on is a 1'feeling". The 
negative prehens1on eltOludeAfeeli.ng. When something oaours 
which is incompatible with nn actual entity's sub3eat.1ve aim. 
1t excludes it by not feeling it. For.instance. red refuses 
to prehend in a positive manner red. but negatively. prehends 
it. Negative prehensiona are associated OnlJ With eternal 
obJeota. Further treatment will be given in the discussion 
of "The Theory of Feelings''• 
The painter has reached an artistic satisfaction when 
he realizes that every element or part of the picture blends 
in harmoniously with the other parta. When ane:, actual entity 
has achieved "definiteneasn or a whple 1o wbioh ea.oh element 
fits in correctly. then it has reached that stage called 
satisfaction. "The final phase 1n the process of oonorasoence 
32 
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constituting an aotual entity, is one complet. fully determinate 
feeling. This final phase is termed the satisfaction. It is 
fully determinate (a) as to 1ts genetts. {b) as to its objective 
charaoter for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as to its 
prehension- positive or negative. of every item. in the universe."3f 
In this paper so fsr. w& should have gained a fair view of 
the fund81!lental notions of tbe Philosophy of Organisms. The 
treatment of forms. eternal objects and f eeli.ngs has b!en rather 
sketch¥• These merit a distinct treatment in themselves. 
"Eternal objeatstt nee'i to be considered for they have an 
important distinotion in tti'hitehead 's philosophy. Each "ooonslon" 
has a core of character of its own. and is integrated b1 the 
special way in which that "occasion" combines a number of what 
we call "universal" oharaoters (shape. colour. savour,. eto.). 
These are very muob like the ~forms" in Plato's !imaeus. These 
were called simply "objects" :ln his earlier works (chapter on 
"ob3ectsn in Concept of Nature} but later he named them eternal 
objects. It seems that he has also quite radically changed his 
notion of what the objects really are. lle f trst thought of 
universals as recurrent types of uniformity exhibited in the 
process but without any status outside it. In the processes 
of becoming in the world. certain npatter.ns" or types of cohesion 
might recur again and again. We give this recognised form of. 
similarity of patterns in repeated processes a general name. 
Ob~ects nre those fo1·ms cf llefinitenesa whioh are recognised. 
The real essences of ob3ccts called "living" is that they are 
31. Twenty-fifth Category of The Categories of Explanation •. 
rhythmic. 
»ut. as already mentioned in Soienoa nnd Modern World and 
Prooesa and Renlit7 he calls the "obleots•t net-ernal ob3eotsn 
and defines them broadly as «.forms of definitenesstt or "pure 
potentials for the specifio determination of matteri.J of' fao-ts.• 
"The word object thns means an entit1whioh is a potentialit;y 
for being a component in f'eeling."32 
These potentials have to exist somewhere. or must abara.oterit:s& 
an actual ontl tJ.- ( aooording to the Ontological. Principle). 
something cannot acme out of .nothing. iJ!bese "eterna1sn are com-
ponents of the primordial nature of God. fhore are no new eternal 
objeots. When we thini that we recognise a new eternal object 
it is because we recognize onlJ s new oombitnation,orpermutation 
of. the infinite variet-y of forms "primordially" envisaged 1n 
God. This gives God a distinctive plno& 111 Metaphysics. 
Let us see bow it 1s that the Giernal ob3eots al'$ apart from 
the temporal oourse of events. God'e-Primordial nature is the 
ground-transcending the temporal world in that it consists of the 
possibilities as yet unrealised in it. Ris Consequent Nature 
supplies what is lacking in the Primordial nature by being an 
order of living experienoe in place of the abstract entertainment 
os possibilities. !he existence of order in the world is due to 
the immanence of God in lUe Consequent Nature. So God is both 
transcendent and immanent. It seems that God is not only the 
sum total of poss1bi11t1es but be is also the urge towa:r·d their 
actuality 1n spaae ana time.. No entity can reaoh its subjective 
32. Prooese and Reality. p.136 
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aim until it prehends an eternal ob~eot. There ls no dualism 
here. for the world of events. that is. the process of becoming• 
1s reall1 not aotua1·unt11 it includes the order of eternal 
ob~eots• 
Whitehead himself has said that his "forms" are somewhat 
Platonic. Re sa.w the problem as did Plato. that of· the disen• 
truigilement of tho p; rmanenoes 1n the universe ·from the passing 
:tlux. 
God., however .. is not the only formative element which 
oonst1tutes the oharaoter of the temporal world. The all 
inclusive univers~ consists of the temporal. worl.d and the follow-· 
ing formative elements: 
l• "~he creativity whereby the actual warld bas its 
oha:raoter of temporal passage to nove1ty.. 2. !he realm of 
ideal ent1 ties. or forms. which are in themselves not actual_. 
but are suoh that they are exemplified. 1n everything that is 
actual. according to some proportion of relevance-. s. fhe 
actual but non-temporal entit7 whereby the indeterm1nat1on of 
mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom. ~his 
non-temporal actual anti 'ty is what men call God-the supreme 
God of ·rationalized religion.tt 33 
One other interesting feature of Dr. ~nitehead's philosopbJ 
ot organism iSthe "or1t1que of pure feeling". "!he philosophy 
of organism aspires to oonstruot a critique of pure feeling in 
the philosophical position in which Kant put hi& q~itique of 
Pure Reason. This should also supersede the remaining Critiques 
required in the Kantian Philosophy."' 34 
It has been mentioned that Whitehead describes events in 
his later works as "processes of experiances,.t. That is to say• 
33,. "Religion in the Making". p.90 
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they have Sttbjeotive aims and theso aims determine what type of 
actuality they will be. This is quite unlike xant who states 
that the ob3eotlve world is built up of the experiences of the 
subject. Whitehead means that the subject is oonstruoted in 
the wa7 tbat it teels its ob3eotive world. A thing grows into 
a unity, into a satisfaotion realised. ( a oonoresoenae) "'because 
of the way it feels other actual intities. Some entities are 
eliminated• neglected or passed over. others are sought in the 
process of a oonoresoenae. The future ~vent,~hibh will be the 
outcome of the present ent1t1 is determined by the way it feels 
in its present phase. We mu.st bear in mind. that feeling as 
used here means any kind of experienc~ between e~tities. It is 
a general term. including the action of 'an entity or its being 
acted upon. It seems that Whitehead would interpret the wav~ 
lengths and vibrations of modern phyaios as undulations or 
"waves or emotions". In the "Ca.tegoreal ob~igationstt he states 
bis theories of the c:f'itique of .feeling. 
There are three olesses of feelings. the l~st of wblob ia 
somewhat peoulier. These &l"e physical. ooncaptua1. end "hybrid 
physical feelings"• 
Accord.ing to Whitehead the aotu.al entity is always 41polar. 
"Any instance of experienoe is dipol~r. whether that instance 
be God or an actual occasion of the world.n 35 
The "physical polen of an ocoe.sion is its f(?eling of other 
actual entities; the "men:tal pole" is its feelings of eternal 
objeots. This conceptual feeling is a07 prehansion of eternal 
SS. "P'ioces's and Iiea11'Ey,. p.li4 
objects. This does not imply consoiousnes& ~ut a kind of feeling 
he describes by t~e word «appetitiontt. 
"Appet1tion 1• is at 011ee tho oonooptnal valuation of an 
immediate- physical feeling combined with tho urge towards realiza-
tion of the datuWi conoeptually prehended. For oxample-':thftst" 
is an immediate ph~ioal feeling integrated with the conceptual 
prehension of its guenoh1ng." 36.- This conceptual feeling. tl1ere-
fore.., must ~e defined as an urge. a desire for an unrea1ised 
something in the futura. based on it being present 1n the form 
of an appetlte at the same time. 
The physioal feelings tn·e.::1oro or less. a passive state of 
relntion•:~,l'°!Things are prehended 1n a passive sort of a manner. 
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The third class of feelings he calla "hybrid physical feelings"~ 
There are two sub-species of hybrid feelings which are_ those that 
feel ti.~ ~onoeptunl feelings.of temporal actual entities• and 
th1'se that feel the oonoeptual feelings of God• This third class 
of feelings is somewhat obscure.and unclear. It seems that he 
means when we are prehending this desk as· green we:· are feeling 
the desk as prehending conceptually the eternal object green. 
As we have already said. the occasions are the result ot 
the way in which they prehend or feel the other.entities. The 
material bodies are the results of a genetic chSl'acter inherited 
through sn historic rou.te o! actual occasion. ln fact some of 
these routes form these bodies. fhere is little deviation between 
the entit-tes in their route of succession. ThBJ produce little 
or no novelty; the last feels the rest of the universe ~omewhat 
36. "Process and Reality".. p.4'1 
8D did the first entity. "'l!he inorganic materialbOdJ is simply 
the reiteration of the same pattern through a sucoassion ot 
events. But there comes a stage when "conceptual feelingstt 
begin to be present which is called the "organio" or living 
stage. A high degree of subjective unity. or f01'U is present · 
in the higher forms of life. When the originative urge towards 
an increase in sensitivity is high in the oooes1on then it. is 
a "m.entnl f.eeling". This intens1 ty of &ppeti ti on deseri bes 
tbe high levels of life. When the procoss merely shows pure 
repetition then a material and mechanistic level is the out 
come. nature at times does shpw creative navanoe. for in 
evolution we find orders of species reached and transcended. 
The order of nature is aesthetic. It is at heart a center of 
feeling or experience. The aesthetic order of nature implies 
that as the things grow in sensitive feeling and aa they 
oonoeptnally feel the "mental·pole" of aotunl entities they 
become members of higher levels. of life. 
In closing this chapter we. might say that Mr. Whitehead 
has sought to give a oomprellensiva. systematic philosophy of. 
the uni verse.. He sho\".S daring original! ty in his treatment of 
many of the problems which have provoked serious thinking from 
students of metophysios. Re baa obso\lrea his thought in several 
plaoes through the nse of f orb1dd1ng perplexing terms in his 
attempt to escape ambiguity. His philosophy of nature as an 
organism bns uniq.1e distinctions. though it mnst be remembered 
that he is not the first to formulete such a conception. ne 
diffe~s somewhat :f'rom Hegel •s theory of the world as an 1·organism" 
in that he empbaaisoa the importance of the lndividnal. Re owes 
much to Plato an:.~ Aristotlo in his construction of ideas oonoern1ng 
form and matte:- or the permanent and tho changing. "Creativityu 
is nenrl1 the so.me doctrine as Bergson's "Elan Vital''• One of 
the greatest oontributions_whieh he has made to this generation 
of ph11osophers wbo are inclined to lGave God out; of the meto-
pbyai cal realm is his concept of God. This contribution shall be 




The Concept of Goa in Whitehead's Philosophy 
!be concept of Goel is an important factor in the Philosoph7 
of Organism. Ur., Whitehead in his later works goes so far as to 
.say that not onl1 colour. souna. taste, eto. but also that our 
ideas of good and bad are intrinsic values of an aesthetic order. 
Science cannot be thought of apart from theology nor can Science 
and theolog7 be sbeltered from metaph7sios. nor meta.physics from 
either of them. According to Professor Whitehead there would be 
no nature. no science without the presence and aativit1 of.God. 
Little or nothing is sa1d in Prinoinles of Natural 
Kno•vledge nnd Oonoept of lfature- concerning God. The fo.ll discus-
sion of God and religion begins in the last three chapters of 
Science and the Modern ~orld. !leligion in the Yaid.n.p:-. and is 
completed in the last obnpter of Process and Reality• In this 
part of the paper I shall somewhat limit my treatment to the con• 
cept of God alone. and intend to discuss the religious aspects 
of his phi losopb1' in the next chapter. 
·First. let us tr1 to understand the oonneation between his 
Category of the Ultimate (creativity} and God.· If we remember 
we described oreativit1'as the pure. formless,. su'tatantial aa-
t1Vity which is the universal of universals. This creativity is 
boundless ,1n possibilit~es and if there were no limitations we wonlc 
have no nature. no science. onl1 a chaos. ~here ls. of a neces-
sl ty. an original limitation on this areativitv. which is some 
order of value's in the realm of possibilities. whioh Dr. Whitehead 
¢alls the Primordial ttature of God. "Unlimited possibility and 
abstract orestivit~ can produce nothing. The limitation •. and the 
basis arising from what ts already actual., are both ot the::t 
necessary and interconnected."n 3'1 
It Js rather di·ffionlt to see why God comes into existence 
in the manner Professor Whitehead has explained it. Since all 
aotual entities are creatures of creativity (God ia an actual 
entity) it seems que~r and quito impossible for unfettered and 
tulbo"O.llwtftormle~s activity to oreatff the primordial limitation. 
Whitehead explains it in· this manner. 0 In all philosophic 
theo17 there ie an ultimate whioh is actual in virtue of its 
accidental embodiments. an' apart from these acoic1ents is devoid 
of aotnalitv. In.the philosophy of organism tbia ulti:mo.te·is 
termed "creativity"• and·God 1s its primordial. non-temporal ao-
oident." 38 We have here the old traditional Cosmological problem 
of tho existence of God. Professor -Whitehead is somewhat unclear 
in meeting the problem. Be no doubt plaoea a sharp distlnotion 
between creativity and God. lf God la a"ereaturetr then creativit1 
is prior to God. 
God has two natures, being viewed as primordial and conse-
quent. tbnt is n Pr-1mor41al and a Oo.nsequent nature. 
5'• «Proaess and Real1tyn, p.152 
38. Ibid• P• 10 
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"V1ewe4 as p1~1~·u:;:•dta1 •. be la· the nnlimitod coooeptusl 
roal1sat1o:n of tho &bsolufio wenltb of potflnt1nll t,v.• 39 All 
ot the toms ot ordeP 4epen4 ttpon th 1~ nstnre ot G«l•. 
?ro:teesor Wh1tebarul s ts tes that Soa 1n th!s nattln? 1~ unoo nus!ous 
tor bta fool1n~ ~e only e1.moe1)trtW. GM laetka the f"ulla'9ss ct 
actuality. fhoae oono&ptual feel1cgs are nr..eor...aoiouit bea•uae 
thor are apart f'rom complex intesr11tion T:!th ~~1cel feellogG1rc 
1~0oa ic Bia Prhlm·tUal Baturo lo 004 as the UmtRetl !lever.• ~t 
God la al&o actunl end o!ul&nicrns. Gad· frat1 the stentlpo1n.~ of 1Us 
f.'lental pol"& 1s uncoru1cirue b1t frcrm. tb~ aspeet of Ille p~losl 
Polo ls oonsctone. Ee ~ometl. ot:n1ool<ms when bia conoepttrnl feel-
ing& a:re lntereovcn "'-th t-he. ovcl<\ri.r1i) ev~nts <it toe pb7sical 
worla. "i!hns. smlori:om!ly t·O.all Qotnnl ent!t!es. th~ a~tnn of 
42 
Goo is 41polsr. Re h&s a pr!r.:ordinl naf:u!'$ sn5. a oonsequent nature. 
The aons4tqtttU'~ natt1ro cf God le c~tis61ons. sno 1t 1a the r~'lll11e""' 
tlon of tbe aotmtl W•'1"ld in the tu1itl' of' bl.a J»t'i!re• and thrm1gb 
the transfor.a'Jat1on of h1s w1et,O!a• 'flle pr1mcrt11nl nattire 1s 
eonecptnal., tl'm eonseq~lttnt mture :ts the wogViilg of·~ •n peysioal 
toellnga upon hls pr.t mord1 n l oon.oeptu•., 40 '!he· primO?'tllal nature 
of Cod aupplles tho mntnph:;stoal unilerl:rtng -t;!or~H. t!oms,. the J.nitial 
urge toward '·tm r!Yht~st oraor poaat'ble whl~b ri)1~ht 'to t"'(ilaliaed of 
tho nbst:raat postdl~ 10 l deals { etGT"nn l objsotn l 1n t110 prcoesa of, 
beottnln€t'.• In Ria Oonae<rnent uatnro b& sa.vea tbt'h 11ot-la th0t-a~h hG 
a1a. not create it-. "Re d01'& not cr~uito tb& mr·1a •. he naves it: 
or., more eootll"atel1. be 1s the poet of' thQ '1brld •. tti th tnn«er 
patience letJfli~ lt t-7 his vialen of tl"t!th. bQtn1t,-., ana E~oodneee"tt 41 
So God is both transcendent and iwman~nt •. 
Dortby tt. Emmet he.a given UG this comparison Of creativity 
ana God in Whitehead's philosophy Vlith the Doctrine of the 
Trinity in the Alexandrian.Fathers. 
ttBut if we could Bay thnt he intends the distinction ot 
priority· in creativity and the Primordial Nature to be simpl7 a 
log-ioal one. we night say that we l".ave something not_ n.n1ika tbe 
Doctrine of the Trinity in the Alexandrian Fathers. (a} In the 
first place .. we have the Father as creative power; (bl we have 
the ltl1mitntion11 in virtue of which God ls pex-feo.t; (o) we have 
the ,same ambiguity as ther~ is between Origen•s doctrine of the 
Eternal Generation of the Logos. and.his 5ubo~dinat1onism in 
speaking -ot the Logc;>s as a d:erived J)&itJ' (and so perhaps opening 
the way to Arianism)• ( d} There is the interest in oosmology1 
in God in llis relation to the world.,, which looks on the oreator 
ana the creation ns in some way correlative. I would snggest 
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that this interest, in cosuu~_logy wat:J. obaraeteristio of the Platonic 
JJhristiq_ni tr of th£L:~lexdnrlrian .. ~a_phers,. in al nt:rast to the co.n• 
oentrat1on on the Trinity in the .Latin Fathers as·s description 
of tho .mturo- of God alone by Ritnself. apart from the world and 
condescending to it._ {e} If we rule, out the Platonic-._ 'Or rather 
Neo-Platonio dualism., and the view of matter as evil. if not 
illusory.- whieb always casts 1 ta shadows on Alexal'ldTlan Chriat!.an 
Platonism.- 'we>might aay that its viuw of creation it$ n~t tllllik.e 
thnt of th.e~PhilosoPley'- of organism. in so far as c~~ation is 
regarded as a proaess inade possible by the 1noomin.iJ- of the wisdom 
of God--a gradual becominc; of order with God's immnnc.nee as the 
measure of its asetbetio oonaia.teney. Wee might even suggest 
that tho ~neons'' _of the, Alexandrians were a mytho1ogioal axpres• 
sio.n of n speculation similar, to Whiteheads concerning other 
types of w~rld order; whereas ·the perfect order would be achieved 
through the aesth~tio ba!'m-ony of God"e complete immanence; when 
Re will be "all in o.11" :the Roly Spirit might be desoribed as 
the Oonseqttent nature of God• as tl1e measure o:f. tbe creative 
order achieved in the temp't>ral world (not. that is,.. the-_ Clis• 
astrous Platonic notion of-~n inferior .df\:~:tJ which is the S()Ul 
of the world. mt God as :J:nman~nt in the creative ad'1'anoe of the 
worla. snd the reason for the order which makes this advance 
possible).•"' 42 · 
At this point I shall enter into ratber a detsi.led and simple 
aooount of the :rel.a t1on ·of God to the world• 
This Principle of ooncretio.n is not a very difficult doctrine 
to understand. Was it not Termyson wb<>,·~ote these expressive 
42. "Whitehead's Philosophy of Orgnnism".Dorthy tt. Emmet. p.253 
lines about the flcwer in the crar..nicd wall? "If I knew yon. 
root and nll. in all. I should .know what God and man 1a." !iott 
it is precisely this th'lt is implied by the principle of conoro• 
tion. It means to.say thnt all being, everything that has existed 
ana wh1oh exists and that which shall exist is focussed oi'! concen-
trated or made concrete in the flower. The flower is red ~uet 
beo~nse of its setting among all the other things in· the'.un!l{arse .. 
Everything is ·focussed into something else nn:'t a thing is. ~ust 
whnt it is because of wbnt othe!' things nre. 1!he flower pr~hends 
all thJngs and the whole universe becomes concreted in the flower. 
Hot only in the making of. an existent thing is the prehension 
of other things but also the feeling (or entry.into ~be thing) of 
the universals. principles. or possibilities. Though,not an 
existent thing. the 1nfiniti' ot whole numbers. bas also something 
to do. with existent things. fhe abstract form.a. s'uoh as goodness. 
beauty. tl!Utk. redness. hardness. eto. are concreted to some 
extent in any part1Clllar existing thing. 
If notlling exists apart from anything else., then that which 
is concrete is· not an isolated thing. The term oonaret& is 11sea 
to deoiginate the.unification of the many into one. The flower 
is what it is because of temperature. the moisture. the season. 
tlle.looality and other reasons. These things in turn ere what 
th&¥ are because all other things a.~·e whst theJ are. The prin• 
ciple of concretion is inherent in everything which causes the 
organization of all being ~n s~ch a manner that all part1oipatas 
in each and each in 011. 
We might wonder why the princ1p1e of concretion oauses 
all being to enter into all existing- things. Is it because 
of soce external :Being, some transcendental :Being? It stands 
to ·reason there_ ·call be nothing outside of all being;. for all 
being is an inclusive term so. therefore. it cannot be 4ue to 
some external agent. It is because God is immanent in nature. 
The inherent nature of God in all things 1s the oanse for the 
orderliness of nature. If there were no order in nature there 
wonld·be .no vtorld• no. cosmos. only ohaos. 
God .has a purpose in the temporal world which is the attain-
ment of value. 
" "Th~s l•ne of thought extends Xant•s argument. Re saw the 
.neoessity jJor God in the moral order. ·But with his nietaphyalca 
he rejected the argument from bis cosmos.. The metaphysical 
doctrine. here exponnt\td. finds the foundations of the world in 
the aesthetic experienoe·. rather than. as with A.ant-- in the 
cognitive and oonoept1ve experience. All order is merel1 certain 
aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world ·is th&_ outcome of 
the aesthetic order. and the im!:lanence of Goa.n43 
«!fbe oraer ·of the world is no accident. -There is not hint. 
aotunl which could be actual without aom& measure ot order. The 
religious insight is the grasp of this truth; That the order. of 
the world. the depth o~ realitJ of the world. the value of.the 
world in the whole and 1.a 1 ts parts. the beauty o~ the tror1d. -
the zest of life. the peace of life. and the master7 of evil are 
all bound up together-not aecidentally ~ buti''b¥-·:l!eason of this 
trnth: that the universe exhibits a oreativlty>witb infinite 
freedom. and a refilm Of fbrms W1~h infinite possibilities; but 
that this oreativit'W and these forms are together iinPotent to 
aohiev-e notuali ty apart :from. tha clo~pl1t:tea ideal hnrmony "~ which 
is God."44 · --
..Tho o.rAar of nature is aestbeiht~ratber'."-tha.n moral or oon-
oeptual because of the inherent being -ot the poet of the world. 
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Goa S..n !U.s Com;6qt1~t tditure. ~his order in Which nll brttng. 
evoeytblng (to a ottrtMn dci-:~&o) is cen~tttu. into ooah act?ui.l 
ocoaston cot'J.14 ~ oonq. other than ttn ae.-atb~t110 nntttrc. !t) lmvs 
an aesthetta ~arl':lMO: t-rom th~ vlewlt\e or ft ~1oce of ert ls to-
reolbfll that al1 of the <tlements. color. eouM.,. ete. blend ~4 
harmonifte no an to create a single to-t .... <\l onlmlrtat1vo eff~ct. 
-'re- -have an atJSthot1c experier.;0e of t1.nt-n~ is to feel nll bo1ng 
'foooasnd into a -a1ngle oonorete oveat. "t;& b~CO:".~u aware nf the 
eono?ete fnllncss of -thin~n. in an aosthet1 o @1%pOr1ettoe of ®tnro. 
Go4 is not pnfltbe1ot1o in natn": ~ le n~t the sonrc~ o! 
all bel1.1g; be la not o e1~eetor. lnt tho etlpreme t'r!aoiple -of 
41sot'1m1Mt1on and dist1!let1on. l!e is thtl pr!Jl'JO!ple 1'hleb plnoes 
a i.U.st1tlatton ~t~n go-id n11ti ev11. Goa 1n gofld ftt16 te tbe 
nonroe of nll goodness. "Among mellevttl nna t:n0d~rn pld.lostrphers. 
ru:rx1o;1s tn e-st~'hlieh the rel1~ioos t:Jigni:ficnnoo ot God• aa. tU'Jfortu-
mte ba'bit ha& prevn1loo c.f ptt:v!mt to him ~tap'hy9f e~l Ot')~;pl!mcnts. 
fiQ h.'la tl>)c:n eonoeiVffd as tbe fo1.u1dntion -0t th& tmtatlh}1S1osl t!i'tna-
t1on w!th 1te ulttmnte eottvity., !f this <tttnoevtion tu ri~bcr!J11 to. 
there oan be no n1terne ti Vt'\. el:~ept to disown in Bia th~ ·ori~ln ot 
all Q1111 ss well· .~8 :of ell ~od •. Re 1e tt1en tb~ $lJpl't''l!t& eutha.r o:t 
thG plny. and to E:!J~ ·t.11nst. thi:.~1·efi_)ro., be ascribed its ewrt con1oga 
no \troll ~a 1 t-G $\leccss. If he bo cH.>ceo1 vsd aG tt.h~ &.Jp!"'crru,. rrnnnd 
fetp lir.d.t.nt.ton. it _stanils in Rie Vm"N ootnre to if!Vide t~e Good from 
the i-v11. nn« to. e$t~bllab tt";~son ulthin:~b~? i;10m1rE1ooo $~:prei::c.~' 45 
£v11 ts tbet forne t'.'bl ch hlr:iiern the ftlll crpor~ Jen ot the-
prio?ipl& of oo~etHu::. !t la tbat ~hioh kee-pn th1? rti.anv fruu 
partloipat!n~ ·sn th~ on.1. Evil 'o 'PU'i'tto·ne is to tear Aown the 
concrete worla. ?t wlll ,r,;evc:r f'tlllll' do th ie for 1f it dcea it \~ ll 
4cetror itst!tlf beelttts& it trould bnve vo turthe:- task 11 all otlr,Prete-
nesa '1Gre a est:rvi·ea. 
God as the sum total of all possibilities is the oonst1-
tut1 ve order and as suoh be transcends the world. :But this 
realm of possibilities, this order of eternal objeota enters to 
some extent in the actual world of eveAts. tberef ore. God i:J 
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also immanent. God i8tends to make the world ever more concrete • 
. Professor Whitehead has attam~pted to formulate his con-
ception of God somewhere between the old doctrines d! God as 
the impersonal order of the universe a.na the dootr1n& of God as 
the one person oraat1ng the universe. God 18 an actual entlt7 
and to be an aotual thing is to be limited. !bis limitation 
·1s goodness or harmony. Therefore. Be is finite or limited. 
"The nature of God is the complete oonoeptu.al realization of 
the r(alm of ideal forms. The kingdom of Heaven is Goa.----fhe 
depth of his existence lies be1yond the VUlgar1t1es of praise 
and power.--The power by which God sustains the world 1s the 
power of himself as the ideal.---He is the binding element in 
tho v1orld. The consciousness which ie 1nd1v1dllal in us. is 
universal in him: the love Whiah is partial in us is all-embracing 
in him. Apart from him there oonld ·be no vrorU. because there 
could be no adjustment of individuality. Bis purpose is always 
embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state 
of the world. Thus all attainment is immortal. in that it 
fashions the actual ideals which are in God as 1 t is now--Re 
is not the world. but the valuation of the world.n 
It has been ver1 stimulating to many religious philosophers 
to know that one who holds a chair in a distinguished univers1ti' 
has sought to "place God. the eternal in timen restoring somewhat 
the ancient conception of a "living God'-• who is constantlr seek-
ing to sustain the world through the power of himself as an ideal. · 
In his discussion. •critique of Feelings"., he bas made nll things 
"spiritual" in the sense of haVing sentience, feelings, prehension 
and value. These things are socially lntorlooked with.one another 
in an aesthetic order. l3y making all things "spiritual" beoe.use 
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of the presence of the p:rinciple of concretion. he is able to 
escape the problem which many theologians face when they claim 
the existence of lifeless dead matter in a world ruled by a 
spiritual sll".'"illeluaive being. The older theology looked upon 
God as a great intellect Who ruled bJ force. Whitehead has put 
forth 1n its plaoe a oonoept1on. that God is love whieh is 
iI11mB8Elllt in ever1 process of becoming. But this love •s a kind 
of an unoonsoious quality of harmony among things enil it seems 
that bis notions of God and religion are not qu.ite adequate to 
meet the demands of a struggling people endeavoring to become 
completely adjusted in a changing world. 
Though. perhaps.. too many quotations bav$ already been 
given. the.writer finds it hnrd to refrain in concluding tbis 
chapter. from qu.oting the final su.mmar7 of the relation of 
God and the world. which Mr. Whitehead has expressed in terms 
of a group of antitheses. tti'hese apparent self-contradictions 
depend on neglect of the diverse categories of existence. In 
each. anti theses there is a shift of meaning which converts the 
opposition into a contrast. 
It is as true to say that God is permanent and the world 
fluent ... as tbat the Vlorld is permanent and God is fluent. 
It is as true to say thnt. in comparison with the world. 
God is actual eminently. as that in eomparison with God. the world 
is actual eminently. 
It is as true to aay that the world is immanent in God. aa 
tb&t God is immanent in the world. 
It is as trne to sar that God transcends the world 9 as that 
the world transcends God. 
mt is as true to say that God breates the world as that the 
world creates Goa.i'4'1 
4'1. Process and Realit1. p.528 
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Chapter III 
Dr. Whitehead and the O~istian !rsdi tloilalist "On Religio.a .. 
Dr. Whitehead has said many thlngs oonoarnl.ng religion. 
Raligi_on i,n ,the lla.,k,ing ls devoted exolus1vel1 ~:O the essence., 
foundation and role of religion in ~he realm of' buman values._ 
M11oh haa been said llb1oh present and future generations Will deal 
with. This paper TIOU.ld not be oomplete ttnless it included· a 
discussion of his 1deaa concerning religion. 
_The nature of reliti:ion and Goa: are dolt with in much the 
fl8lnG way as Whitehead bas constructed bis speculative soientifio 
philosophy. lle baa consistently argued that science and religion 
depend on each other: neither one ean be entirely explained apart 
from the other+ Re attempts to be as.exact. concise nna aoientifio 
about religion as be is when· dealing with ~tter. with space and 
time and other phyaioal oonoepto. Dr. Whitehead baa a 11U!11ber of. 
times spoken of the danger of .speaking of God in bumnn analogies. 
but if we are not serio11sly mistakon._bis conception o:f religion 
and God is somewhat· antbropomorphio. Onn one speak of God except 
n:ts words be shaded by human experiences? God ia love. beauty •. 
goodness. our !dealt natura is ·rui aestbe~ic order. says·, tffiitehead. 
!b.ese attributes of God and nature are purel~ human, values. It 
1s rnt111.».• d1f!1cult for ua to ur.it~~bt.a1l~ if!iQ the ~b1r~ o:- cr.:nth 
ot a star or plnnet ~-Aa engi aesthetic sign!fic!tn:'lt>. 
so 
l!he:re bse boon a kltld ot & aev(;lorw•errt in hl$ 1itet1s eaa-
cern1ng rcligi-on.. ln Science ru:1 ~he Modern Wot"l..it ~ st•tee that. 
man tee erred in pa.1 tng met;epbz,-elcal co~l!.aeo:ts to God., 'h!t 1n 
bis later wr1 tlngs sone C.hrlst1no theolog!ane have ~ooc4 ra.tu.nns 
to roJoio~. !11 our c1.1f!ontm1on \';'~ w11l t~ to a ic~er !1! 
Ur. Widtehoa-d baa given us tUlY renoon tn thin~ of Goa as a 
..,!>erso®l BP.it!:~{t· 110 a~mls. el~n!4atea. una ~11f!~s hie !dena 
about reli~·J.on ani:t God 1n ~cli~l oe ! n tho Z!nklr'l!i:'c 
...,_.. .... - sq t . 1 J ...... Jt• J J , ' ..... 
aow does Mr. ~lllteh~a!! define r~lig;!ort? In tile toJ.lowing 
d.oftnitiona 1t is ootoa t~~nt he obooeoe. no ~w. strict technical 
moan1G~h bnt npeat:$ Of r(!cl!Si-On in a g0narnl tUH~SG• fh&tl$ !)rOf::m'.Hlt 
phras4}G v:!ll givl'! us e<O!':le- ttlea O'i' tbc o~enu(}& of hie religion. ' 
auel1g !-on is lo~<J~ ~f belief ol~11n~iJS~ tho lmit:s.tti ~srta. 
For tbla reaso~ th€t p~--i:09T:'f rel!g!cus v1r~~ io 11iN.Hl:rtt:;. a 
penetrat.11'g 811lOU'ity-. n· 4-B 
ttttell~lon 1B th~ sr-t une t~ tbwey of tb~ illt~rrmil life 
<>! cmn,. so liir as U; dep ood.s on tii~ !.:'l~1u hlm!Selt &fh1 f:H! -.n1~t ia 
poro~oetrt; in th;p m tnr~ ot tblngs.*' 49 
~1\~l1;dota ie ..-:-bat ttH~ im1vi<hml ltoea r;l th 111~ chut solitul-
ooas.-lt is tb4' tttansition f1!0~1 Goa the- vtd.4 ta Goa tho. ene-:ty. 
an{i fr:om God, ~tha •~1 t;o GOt1- the co~nioth.-"' 50 
•••••• 
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"Religion is the vision of something Which stands beyond. 
behind. and witli~n. the passing flux of immediate .things; some-
thing whiah is real. ana yet wAiting to be realised; something 
which ,is a remote possibility. s.nd yet the greatest of prese.nt 
facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes end yet 
.is beyond all reach; something 'Which Js the ultimate idesl. 
and the hopeless quest.u 51 
UP.eligion ia the translation of general ideas into partllou-
lartthoughts., particu.lar emotions., and particular purposes; it· 
is d,ireoted to t.he end of strotohing indl vidnal interest beyond 
its self-defeating particularity." 52 
It is rather diffic:mlt to, draw any specific oonelttsions 
conae:rning the true m t\1re of religion. 'l!bey are rather vague 
and general and we need to follow him oioselJr in his major 
treatise Reli~ion in the J!ak in,g. 
He states thr1t religion ls not a social fnot. ·He. unlike 
the founders of the great Christian 1nst1tntions has revolted 
against collective enthusiasms. and revivals. Religion is 
solitariness and exists tor the i.ndividual. J!an•s .ideas about 
the Unseen htlve evolved through fcnr stages. ritual,. emotion, 
belief and rationaliaation. · Rituals and emotions are only 
binding elements among group. When one feels a haunting sense 
, of aoli tariness. a feeling of being forsaken t>y all. he is 
experiencing a depth of relig~0t1s spirit. Whitehead ventures 
to say that this feeling was a part ot' the emotions of the man 
on the cross. and Buddha in the desert. Traditionalists would 
never agree tha.t a person is experiencing a- religious s.pUdt 
when having a sense of being forsaken tr God. Only sin oan 
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separate the children from the love oi the 1Ieavenl7 l':ither~ 
:Be11ef ana emotion are tho early stages of ma_n•s religion: 
nnd 1et tie find some 'of the great v10rld rel.igio'(\s using belief 
52 
and emotion in the same manner as did primitive man •. as ends in 
themselves. Whitehead states that ritual is the stimulus to 
emotion. am ~n many group activities. such as holy aa,- festivals. 
revivals .• bibles,· eto. the ritual~ are only repeated in order to 
on301 the emotion.· Rituals and emotions go together and are the 
binding forces of savage tribes.. I snppose that Durkheim's oon~ 
caption of religion would be considered very primitive for 
Whitehead regards a religion aa 4eoaying when 1t s1.nks baok in 
to socia.bilitJ• 
Rituals. emotions and myth$ interact reciprooe.ll1.,,, P..itunls. 
usually prece~e myths for some snimals observ~ r1 tualism and 
have no mythology;. There ia n person or a ~hing which is wori!hiped 
beaause there is a belief that something is to be gained thereby. 
We .usually see a system of bel_iefs built up around this •1hero-th1ng" 
or· "hero-personn. When tbe set of ideas are built sroo.nd e ,;thing 
we get mngio•: when a '?hero•person'' is worshiped we eall it religlo11.· 
Some have implied that this is all that ls necessary for a re11g1on 
beonuse in many instances it has successfully passed the pragmatio 
test. 
l3ut ilhitehead :bas gone one stage further and states that 
the last step is a system of coordianted beliefs Which he terms 
as btionaliam., This final phase includes religion as a solitary 
affair. This stage begn.n about six thousand yea:rs ago when 
man first began to rationalise about religion. At the begin• 
ning of this period we see the prophets. a ~ew an and then one 
man with twelve desciples who were nearly universally re~eoted•· 
~hey felt the elements of true religion with its notes of 
solitariness. This "rational religion apt>Bals to.the direct 
intuition ot speoial oaoasions. aod to the eluoidatory power of 
its concepts for all oooasions.u 53 ~ first beginnings of 
this stage began where the individual rebelled aga1mt tribal 
~ustom and used his faculty of ethical 1ntu1t1on.. ~he prophet 
Hosea was an example of this type when he sa1a. n:ror I desired 
merc1 • and not . sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than 
burnt offerings." Religion begun to have individual1stio farms 
and lost its communal aspeot. !he itliiiVidtuil is saved ~o heaven 
and not the group. All this is ~ust a.e it should be. believes 
Whitehead. for· enlightment. tolerance., and respect for the 
individual com.es with the appearing of the stage of rationalism. 
In the communal stage you obej God because· it is His Will~ but 
in the stage of thought consoioasness you obe1 because you wi.ah 
to be like Bim. «1t is the difference between the enem1 y0:t1 
ooneiliate and the oompabion 'Whom you imitate.tt 54 
It is rather difficult to find reasons for holding valid 
the above aontent1o.ns of \fhitohea.a., Rs ms.1 or may :not be justi-
fied in stating religion is decaying when it sinks into sooiabilit1• 
There are many students of comparative religions who would dis• 
pute bis account of the orgin of the great world religions. 
Frankly, I think tba t Mr. Whitehead has slipped up here in apply-
ing his metaphysics to religion. If ha·tesehes an7 one thing in 
his metaphysics it is the note of universal values. If God• 
the Principle o~ Ooncretion. is the cause of the many to~be uni-
fied into one than it certainly seoois that progressiveness is 
prese.nt in the appearant?es of fewer and greater group i-el1gions. 
Of oourse. each occasion has a·un!que element., but it is largely 
determined by the ntttu.re of other occasions. If tb~ \'torld is 
an order of 1nterlook11'l8• interacting sooial ~oroes. then it 
appears quite contradictory to assert that a religion is in 
deaay when it sinks baok into sociability., I do not think that. 
we oan follow him in tbis. 
Aocording to Professor i7h1tahead the notion of' God ie the 
fundamental religious dogma and all other dogmas are· snbsidary 
to it. Ho gives a treatment of' the three main simple interpre-
tations of ooncepts of God which are popular today.. Ba states 
them as follows: first. the Eastern Asiatic concept of a.ti imper-
sonal order to Which the world conforms or the ex~rerne doctrine 
of immanence. Second. the ~;-em1t1o concept of a definite personal 
indiviaual. entity wbo is absolute and transcendent. ~his concept 
grew out of a rationalization of ~he tribal goas in the earlier 
communal religions.. The third concept is that of Pantheism, 
God is the only reality .and apart from llim there is nothing. This 
is.the doctrine of monism. 
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Christianity inherited the Semitic concept aud its first 
founders somewhat reshaped it. They understood the d1ff10t1lties 
which came with the acceptance of the entire concept. If he were 
fully absolute and transcendent. then he would be left out of the 
entire metapbyaionl realm of rationalization; we would know 
nothing about him. Again. there is the difficult7 of proVi.ng 
this concept. Anselm an.a Desor~tes have suggBsted tbe nontologi-
oal pro~f" bnt for the moat pl rt it is snperfieial and useless. 
Whitehead fnrther says that Christ was one of the first to 
introduee the ideas of immauenoe to this o-0ncept-· vrhen he explained .• 
'1~he XJ.ngdom of Ree.Ven is within you." When Obristlan theology 
was Platonic in essenee it followed this thought of the immanence 
of God,., but the modern world has lost God and is seeking him 
bean.use of the .return to. the Semitic conoept-. The three-fold 
personality of God is a clear proof that Ohristinn th-eolog has 
returned ·to the ancient belief. !fhe tnOdern church haa fallen to 
the temptation of explnining Goo and his relations to the '1iorld 
1n too simple terms. It has beeome too 1doalisticall7 rational. 
and ha.s .not resorted to the various developm.ents in tbe realm 
of metnphysios.. It bas sheltered theology from eoience tibi~h is 
wrong. for there is no-short cut to truth. 
Religion really needs a metaphysical foundation. so as to 
find and olass1fy the .meanings of the universal religious emotions• 
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Mankin:~ is univers~lly religious. but dtte to fear of a metaph1sioal 
examination. few real saientifio ideas have been contrUmted by !the 
various religions. Feith bas played too great a par~ in human 
experiences. Let us seek for penetration and claritJ' in our .search 
for the real elements of tho TIOrld. All about ua and in us we see 
the interdependence of the universe. Things are passing; things 
are all with us. Ohenge and-permanence a.re the real truths about 
tho actual occasions of existcnoe. !here is the actual world of 
events which is passing in time. but there are. also.those elements 
which go to makf' this world's fo1111ntio.n.. :Beyond the actual world 
and its formative elements. we know nothing for these t-~-:o faotors 
form a.~ all-inclusive universe. (The wrjter bas already stated 
these for1:-ative alamanta previously in this paper.} These elements., 
briefly. are crcativit1\-~hioh accounts for nove1~1; the rea~ of 
fo1ms. not actual in themselves~ tut axe.ta.plied to a degree- in 
,. 
everything that i.s no1rnsl; and God the aatual but non-temporal 
entity. All of thaaa eleoents enter into every actual entity. 
God as one of these elements enters the ,*<unpo1·~1: tZ>rl~d for 
the purpose of attaining valuas. Be has s creative ~urpose f(lr 
without bim the other formative elements would fail in their. 
functions. In every ercati ve pb.asr.~ he is present for it is be-
oause of him that the indetermir'.ation of mere creativitl? is made 
into s sort of determion to frenclom. Orea ti vity is boundless and 
would neke tor no real order of 1Jotnr:: i.:f it vmrc not fo:r God 
who. plaoes value;:; Ol'Lobjaeti ves for each phnse of levnls to seek •. 
rr'sliGe and enjoy. Dut ho is not th·:: cauae of oomplete determinism 
for then he would be the cause of all things 1nol uding evil. Re 
aids creativity to attain a measure of determination-. God in his 
Primordial nature possess the ideals or possibilities• that 1a Re 
ia trv.nnoandent; in His Consee;.11ent nature he is imfll8nent in the 
world struggling and bnlping the actual occasions to renah those. 
possibilities •. God is fully consisterit' with himsel.f. he never 
changes, therefore. he does not include evil for the note of evil 
·1t the result of internal inconsistency. 
There is an aesthet1a oreer in ·nature due to tho i::nnanonoe 
of Gou. nThe order of the world ls no aeo1dent. Thero is trothing 
actual without some rneasure of. ord'er. The religions insight is 
the grasp of this trnth& That the order of the world, the depth 
of realit'J of the world. the value: _of. tho. wo.rld ,in 1ta whole end 
its parts. the boa~~ of the world,, the zest of life. ·the poaos of 
life. and the ns.stery of evil,, lire all bound together...:-not acci-
dentally. b1t by reason o:f this truth: th.11t the universe exhibits 
6V 
a creativity \'iith infinite possibilities: but that this creativity 
and thosa forms are toga·;;her impotent to achieve actuality apart 
fror.1 the. completed· !deal harmony. which is God."' 55· 
As we nave already said• Mr. Whitehead bas reJected both· 
tho doot:t•ines about the naturo o:f God wbioh sta>tos him as the 
impeI'sonal order of ths univorse nnd as the one person creating 
the~universe. His on n conoeption of God \Vhiob is construed in 
terms of a ileaaripti ve metaph;1s1cal systeo. onn somewtat be afmted 
in this sense. 
God is the Kingdom of Heaven; tr.at 1s to say;:' h1a .nature is 
the complete conceptual realization of the realm of idenl forms. 
He is. .complete in .the sense ·that he hae a conceptual realization 
of the possibilities of th.a ·3. .. d~l 'forms as elements o:t ·value in 
any· ureative ant. Re ia oot infinite for he hna the l1m1tet1on of 
·goodness.· God is not, however. altogether axolt1ded from the 
55. "Religion in the !.Inldngn. p.119 
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faot of evil. He hns in his own nature the knowledge of evil. pain• 
degradation but it is there as overcome w1 th what -le good. God 
is- the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness. 
Goa•s greatness and his existence lie beyond tha VUlgarities of 
praise or power. There need be no prayers far h& is not a person 
or- a super-person; be cannot interrupt ·the laws of nature in 
answer to a suffering soul. He does not insure a personal immor-
tality nor does he send any one to atone for evil or to save any-
one. 
The power that God has is the power of himself as an ideal. 
The v1orld is savca by its incarnation of God in itself.,· God is 
not the world. but the valuation of the world. Re solves all 
1ndeterm1nat ions by setting forth all the values to be uetermined. 
In a certain sense all attainment is immortal in that it fashinns , 
the actu_al idea.ls which are God in the world as it is .now. :s:othing 
of value is lost under the image ot ''a tender care." 
Obristiartity. aooordir.g to Mr,. White~ead. is decaying beoo.use 
'it has failed to modi~ itself in the light of science. method. 
critical thinking and history. It still clings to impurities.~ 
irrelevant tradition. and foolish dogma.. Some dogma .is necessary, 
but it should be only a means for a general interpretation ot 
religious eXpr~asioo rnth~r than an end. He, bowever •. is rather 
hopeful when he Stl.JS that religion is not dead or dying but it is 
tt1n the making". 
It seems to me- that the above nisaussions should give ua 
rather a comprehensive understanding of Dr. Whitehead's View of 
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religion. For the most part he· has touched upon· many truths in 
calling atten·?,ion to the inco~istencies of a fe\v' of the great 
religions. He has pointed out the fall.nciea of traditional con.• 
ceptions of Goa and has urged the use of science in ~o:rming a 
theology-. .. Re has been fairly sneoessful in attempting to tear 
away many· of the ~oaf folds of. organised religious thought• but 
on the other band he has been equnllt unsuccessful~1& 8llbsti• 
tuting anything that is of praot~.~al value .·for the Obristian. 
Throughtout all of his ~ngs •. the wordGG6d"'1s used. Re 
ha~ a strange.interpretation of the nature of God and his rela-
tion to the world. We wonder why be' doesl1'1! ·go further w1. th the' 
concept of God snd give_ to·'h1m some perso~l att~ibutes. 'f.:Jiitehead 
gives to him no name9 personality or any other personal.attributes. 
lie himself confessed tblt he ha.cl a distaste f~r mch ~ords as 
~pwer-. Forae,. Unknowable •. snd Spirit• Most philosophers eit~er 
giva,Go~·aome personal charncteristies or else call him as, did 
Spencer. the Unlalowable.,.· ·it seems tha.t the main purpose of a 
religion is to aid people to beooma adjusted ln a changing world 
and there is very little in Wh1t$head 's philosoph~. which 'WOµ~d 
aid hnmani ty in. 1ta struggle against the· !naompetenoe. ,greed and 
inertia which threatens civilized lifo. Re b-e:Ueves in progress 
in an aesthetic natnre. · (tbat is In the moral realm). Things do 
not work out so neatly as he supposes. Many thinkers ttoubt moral 
progress. ·War. crime., revenge. cruelty. punishment. •. s:e1.tishness., 
miser1. inlustine. oppression. ignorance are present with us and · 
' . . -
it seems only a short span of 3ears before foolish .wit1onalism 
and patr_iot1sm. will bring hu~an ~ife to a close in a world oonflio-t. 
Accordingly• if one holds altogether with Vfb1tehead. he must accept 
a progress! ve up\1e.rd trend. never vs.eying. toward th& ideal of 
"goodness"• ~he moral history of mankind tends to disprove this. 
for if we must believe in moral progress •. at least., we .tpl.lst face 
the :f a.ot that 1 t oomes 1,11 eyoles s.nd never e steeily unvarying 
upward ascending plane., .. Traditional Christian theology has a 
better exple.nati.on of the presenae .of evil. Though many l.iberala 
thi1* of heaven a.s e stnte of being trad1tional·Ohr1st1anity 
toe.obos abou.t a place called heaven. Dr. Whitehead quotes Jesus-.t 
"'.l:he Kingdom of Heaven is. Within ~ou.n They differ in that. God 
to the traditionalist ls the omnisiaient., omnipotent. creator,. 
the liea.venly Father who knows his· creation._ but to Whitehead he 
possesses nona of these qualities. God here is used as the idea1. 
the highest type of justice~ goodness .and love that WO knoW• :J3Ut 
we m!ll" well wond$r from 'Where are we going to get our ideas of 
tnstice• goodness and lovet;'hl?rof essor Whi teheaa implies that all 
our knowledge comes from the conditions. traditions. ciroumstanoest. 
science and logic. 
Another thing whioh ma.1 be said 1s that V.'hiteheaa.· stresses 
the nooessity of logio and science in tinning ·Goa. traditional 
Christianit1 impliee that God can best be found tbrougb'faith. 
uAmid the ba.1ls of learning one meets God.11 says the philospher. 
11No.n anawers.the Oh-r1st1an. "one sees God in the slums having 
t sup. vli th sinners". u 
Perhaps I have not been justified in expecting too much 
from Whitehead as he tises tha concept "God"• Re no doubt used 
the t~ra in his earlier works to make full and consistent his 
philosophy of the universe. We have a tremendous appreaiation 
o:f this way in which he thinks of God and His role 111 nature. 
Yr. Wh1t~head., however. wanders too tar from soli<l #OWld vhe.n 
bw enters the midstreams of theoretical and praotioal tbeolOBJ 
in .. Religion in the tiak:ingn. Haey will not follow him here,.. 
especially those Vr'ho claim that there are perhaps two types of 
knowiodge; the knowledge of the mind and the intuition of the 
"heart"'• He. however. is a model of inspiration. nm nomfort 
to those who fear that God oannot be logically thought of.ill 
a philosophy of the universe,. 
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